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Abstract  
This paper investigates the work involved in making sense of specific financial 
numbers within a preparer organization and conveying this understanding at the 
corporate-capital market interface. An observation-based study was undertaken of 
the investor relations team’s interactions during the silent period up to the release of 
the quarterly report for a large Northern European bank. This rare empirical material 
was used to trace the successive framing (Goffman, 1974) of the Core Tier 1 ratio, a 
regulated measure of capital adequacy that the case organisation “delivered” on in its 
quarterly report. We argue, in contrast to prior literature, that preparers of corporate 
financial reporting are limited in their choices of the economic reality they present by 
the very process of constructing a meaning of financial numbers. The process of 
framing involved anchoring specific numerical representations to perceived intra-
organizational realities, market audience expectations, as well as past representations 
of financial performance. We observed how specific interpretations of financial 
numbers, as expressed in words and phrases that became imbued with meaning, were 
moved between spatio-temporally separated sites through the circulation of cues. 
These cues provide a scaffolding for the enactment of interpretational frames within 
specific situations – and across sites. The development and circulation of cues in 
interactions between investor relations professionals and numerous other parties at 
the corporate-capital market interface contribute to making financial numbers 
meaningfully anchored, widely distributed and influential representations of 
organizational reality. 
Key words: financial reporting; framing; impression management; investor relations; 
Goffman; capital market 
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1. Introduction 
How to understand corporate financial communication and interpret financial 
performance is a long-standing practical concern. Indeed, the meaning of financial 
reports is a professional preoccupation for numerous actors, including corporate 
managers, capital market analysts, investment managers and standard-setters. 
Accounting scholars have, unsurprisingly, also directed extensive attention to the 
production and use of financial reporting information. More recently, financial 
reporting in the capital market setting has served as a site for sociological 
investigations of accounting within a “context in which it operates” (Hopwood, 
1983). As in adjacent empirical domains, this growing stream of research on 
“financial accounting as social and organizational practice” (Robson, Young, & 
Power, 2017) has broken with previously dominant understandings of financial 
accounting as a tool for objectively representing economic reality (Robson & Young, 
2009). Departing from an understanding that “in communicating reality, we construct 
reality” (Hines, 1988), a developing body of literature has investigated how actors 
such as professional users (Barker, 2000; Bouwman, Frishkoff, & Frishkoff, 1987; 
Durocher & Gendron, 2011; Gniewosz, 1990; Hellman, 2000; Imam, Barker, & 
Clubb, 2008; Imam & Spence, 2016), auditors (e.g. Johed & Catasús, 2018), 
accounting standard-setters (e.g. Hines, 1991; Hjelström, 2005; Young, 2003, 2006), 
and financial accountants (e.g. Barker & Schulte, 2017; Huikku, Mouritsen, & Silvola, 
2017) participate in making particular economic realities viable, visible, and valuable 
through the financial reporting information that circulates at the company-capital 
market interface. A recurrent theme of this research, which is further underscored by 
the practical efforts to organize and standardize the form, content, and 
communication of financial reporting information,1 is that ‘the numbers do not speak 
for themselves’. How, then, do numbers take on a particular meaning? 
We direct this general question towards how preparers of financial reports seek to 
convey an economic reality to the capital market. Scholars have previously observed 
interactions between corporate managers and capital market actors in more public 
arenas, such as the annual general meeting (Carrington & Johed, 2007; Catasús & 
Johed, 2007; Johed & Catasús, 2018) and Q&A sessions with equity analysts (e.g. 
Abraham & Bamber, 2017; Graaf, 2016). One conclusion from the analysis of these 
frontstage performances is that managers, as well as financial analysts (e.g. Abraham 
& Bamber, 2017) and auditors (Johed & Catasús, 2018), contextualize financial 
numbers as part of their active work to maintain a presentation of self. For example, 
Carrington and Johed (2007) have described how top managers enrol accounting to 
construct themselves as ‘good stewards’ at the annual general meeting. That 
managers frame corporate performance in a manner consistent with capital market 
                                                
1 These efforts include the codification of national and trans-national standards for financial 
reporting, the adoption of legal requirements for information disclosure in public markets 
and the establishment and continued sanctioning of an audit profession to monitor and 
promote compliance, as well as the creation and operation of both governmental and 
independent regulatory and oversight bodies.  
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actors’ established expectations of what constitutes good performance and 
appropriate behavior resonates with verbal accounts of what happens in private, 
closed meetings (e.g. Barker, Hendry, Roberts, & Sanderson, 2012; Holland, 1998; 
Roberts, Sanderson, Barker, & Hendry, 2006; Solomon, Solomon, Joseph, & Norton, 
2013). Based on interviews with corporate finance directors and investor relations 
managers, Roberts et al. (2006) concluded that the extensive preparation of corporate 
representatives prior to meetings had “the quality of a rehearsal for a performance” 
(p. 283). This infers that corporate representatives construct and convey an economic 
reality whose form and content is staged to align with external expectations. Yet, as 
Robson and Young (2009) have noted, the “daily practices and mundane decisions” 
(p. 359) that take place within preparer organizations during the production of 
financial reports and associated communication targeted to capital market audiences 
have seldom been directly observed and analysed. 
In the absence of direct observation, scholars have extrapolated preparers’ intentions 
and behaviours in the production of financial reporting information through content 
analysis of outputs. The persistent and asymmetrically positive tone which has been 
identified in the narratives of annual reports, press releases and executive statements, 
has led to the conclusion that companies (or, their senior management) engage in 
various forms of impression management (e.g. García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 
2011; Merkl-Davies, Brennan, & McLeay, 2011; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998). 
Studies have also shown how these positively framed narratives are constructed using 
various rhetorical tools (e.g. Aerts, 2005; Henry, 2008; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). As 
part of the overarching argument that companies engage in impression management, 
scholars have recurrently problematized the economic reality that is conveyed 
through numbers and associated narratives (for an overview, see Froud, Johal, 
Leaver, & Williams, 2006, pp. 122-136). For example, Clatworthy and Jones’s (2003) 
conclusion of self-serving attribution bias in annual reports’ explanations of high vs. 
low financial performance “may prejudice the provision of a balanced, true and fair 
view of the company’s financial performance” (p. 183). Other studies have 
questioned the scope of the reality which is conveyed in accounts of corporate 
performance (e.g. Chwastiak & Young, 2003). The underlying assumption, 
throughout, is that companies have the power to manipulate and mould accounts of 
corporate performance as they see fit (see also Macintosh, 2009).  
Thus, there would seem to be competing accounts of what role preparers play in 
making financial numbers take on a particular meaning: the one of corporate 
representatives disciplined by external expectations to give fitting accounts, the other 
of the company manipulating its environment by crafting stories that make corporate 
representatives look good. However, in both cases, the characterization of preparers’ 
backstage work is largely inferred based on frontstage performances or publicly 
communicated outputs. Our approach to investigating preparers’ role in making 
sense of financial numbers as accounts of a particular economic reality differs from 
previous studies in two ways. The first is our methodological focus on the hitherto 
unobserved backstage work of a listed company’s preparation of financial reports 
and associated communication targeted to the capital market. The focus on 
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interactions within the preparer organization in conjunction with the preparation of a 
financial report, was chosen to gain a more granular account of the social processes 
involved in establishing a certain (sic!) account of economic reality. The second 
difference concerns the theoretical lens through which we choose to analyze the 
observed interactions. To make sense of the various efforts to construct a coherent 
and plausible account of corporate performance, we take our point of departure in 
Goffman’s view of interactions as the site of meaning creation (Goffman, 1974). It is 
through interaction that shared understandings emerge via processes of framing, that 
establish a situated cognitive interpretational schema (frame) between participant 
actors.  Our analysis highlights how traces of previously enacted frames, denoted cues, 
are mobilized in processes of framing financial numbers, and how these numbers are 
anchored to a delimited context. Rather than extrapolating the content of backstage 
work based on the form and content of frontstage performance and formal outputs, 
the chosen conceptualization articulates how the situated construction of meaning 
occurs within – as well as across – sites of interactions. 
Our analysis has traced the emergence of meaning in the drafting of a quarterly 
financial report and related communication guidelines for Q&A and conference calls 
in conjunction with the release of this report. Recent observational studies, notably 
of auditor-client interactions (e.g. Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, & Marché Paillé, 2014) 
have underscored the analytical value of empirical accounts which can ‘unpack’ the 
production of financial numbers. Here, we mobilize such methodological resources 
to investigate a nexus for company-capital market interaction: the investor relations 
function (IR). IR has become firmly established among larger listed companies in 
recent decades (Cheuvreux, 2012; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999). It was a salient insertion 
point for our investigation, since IR is typically where responsibility for the crafting 
of a ‘capital market message’ is formally allocated, and where the production of 
regulated financial reports is practically coordinated (Useem, 1993, pp. 132ff). Our 
empirical material is drawn from the detailed study of activities undertaken by the IR 
team of BigBank2, a large Northern European universal3 bank. A combination of 
observation, proprietary internal document analysis and clarifying interviews gives us 
rare insight into the so-called silent period leading up to the public release and 
presentation of a quarterly report. This hectic part of the quarterly reporting cycle 
was characterized by numerous interactions involving financial numbers and 
accompanying narratives, both within the IR department, and between members of 
the IR function, senior management team and other parts of the BigBank 
organization. From this rich empirical material, we focus on the framing of one 
specific financial measure: the so-called Core Tier 1 ratio.4  
                                                
2 BigBank is a pseudonym. 
3 The term ‘universal’ refers to a bank that offers a full range of financial services to both 
retail and corporate customers. These services include basic transaction services, cash 
management services, corporate finance, trade finance services, investment management, life 
insurance, pension schemes, private banking, investment funds and online trading services. 
4 While the question of what Core tier 1 ratio is constitutes part of the topic of study, a basic 
working definition is appropriate for framing purposes. The Core Tier 1 ratio is calculated 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines our 
conceptual framework, after which we outline key elements of the design and 
undertaking of our study of BigBank’s investor relations function. The subsequent 
empirical account precedes a concluding discussion, which draws out our analytical 
findings and proposed contributions. 
2. Conceptualizing backstage interactions in financial 
reporting preparation  
Our analytical interest in this paper engages with established interests in meaning-
making and accounting in general (e.g. Boland, 1989, 1993; Boland & Pondy, 1986; 
Morgan, 1988; Pentland, 1993), and recent resurgent interests in understanding this 
issue using the work of Erving Goffman (Abraham & Bamber, 2017; Beunza & 
Garud, 2007; Fauré, Brummans, Giroux, & Taylor, 2010; Jeacle & Carter, 2012; 
Johed & Catasús, 2018; Lorino, Mourey, & Schmidt, 2017; Preda, 2009; Skærbæk, 
2005; Solomon et al., 2013; Vollmer, 2007), in particular. A shared attribute in all 
these studies is what Pentland (1993, p. 605) describes as a focus on “the collective 
nature of the setting and the process of the work, rather than the content” of specific 
accounting numbers. This approach draws on the symbolic interactionist tradition, 
where the meaning of objects and actions are assumed to arise in the “situation” 
(Thomas, 1934 [1923], p. 42) as a set of relations formed through the stimulus and 
responses between the individual and a social group (Mead, 1972 [1934], pp. 71-74). 
Goffman’s development of these ideas broadened the concept of interaction beyond 
verbal face-to-face forms to include consideration of objects (e.g. 1959, pp. 22-30; 
1969, p. 19) and mediated forms (1981),5 and has been used to foreground how 
interacting participants interpret representational claims of accounting numbers in 
meetings (Fauré et al., 2010; Jeacle & Carter, 2012; Lorino et al., 2017), as well as 
annual reports (Skærbæk, 2005) and on trading platforms (Preda, 2009).  
The provision of financial information, both within organizations and at the 
corporate-capital market interface, is characterized by a multitude of interactions 
between a diverse range of actors to make sense of organizational performance. 
These interactions lend themselves to the use of a Goffman lens, as a key matter at 
stake is the collective cognitive processes at work rather than the subsequent actions 
that may follow. Several recent contributions have analysed specific actors’ 
presentation of self in public sites of interaction such as the annual general meeting 
(Johed & Catasús, 2018), Q&A sessions with analysts (Abraham & Bamber, 2018), as 
well as private capital market meetings (Solomon et al., 2013). Other studies have 
rather foregrounded the role of accounting information in the construction of 
meaning in this domain. The latter approach has developed within two broad 
                                                                                                                                 
using the sum of a bank’s common equity and disclosed reserves (numerator) and its risk-
weighted assets in the balance sheet (denominator). Risk-weighted assets is a measure of the 
default-related risk of a bank’s on-balance sheet assets. 
5 He was however, not inclined to grant agency to inanimate objects, but rather considered 
these as means and medium for human interaction (see e.g. Goffman, 1969, p. 89). 
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streams. The first has centred on the structural analysis of frames in conjunction with 
external communication of organizational performance (e.g. Beunza & Garud, 2007; 
Skærbæk, 2005). This tradition draws on Goffman’s notion of frame as the basic 
identifiable element that orders social interaction and govern participants’ subjective 
involvement in events (Goffman, 1974, pp. 10f.). For example, Beunza and Garud’s 
(2007) analysis of equity analysts’ reports characterized different “calculative frames”, 
whereby a company (Amazon) was made intelligible in relation to certain analogies, 
peers, and metrics. A frame operates as a structural interaction device that 
participants draw on, deliberately or unaware, to organize the meaning-making into a 
shared understanding of what is going on in the situation. Thus, frames act as more 
than individual schemes of cognition (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014; Dewulf, Gray, 
Putnam, Lewicki, Aarts, Bouwen, & van Woerkum, 2009), by providing the context 
for arriving at a certain shared understanding (Scheff, 2005). The contextualization 
that a frame provides may be clearly circumscribed (a common example of this is 
games, such as chess), while others are less so, “providing only a lore of 
understanding, an approach, a perspective” (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). Yet, by virtue of 
being cognitive constructs, any frame – regardless of the degree of specificity – will 
need to be instantiated by participants in each situation.  
This situated process of framing serves as a starting point for the second stream of 
research, primarily in the area of intra-organizational accounting use, that has studied 
how particular frames are “negotiated and produced in the ongoing interaction” 
(Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 160; see also Czarniawska, 2006). Preda (2009), for example, 
has shown how a trading platform, as a technology of interaction, formats the 
conditional possibilities for calculations made by lay-traders, even as the interactional 
nature of the calculations prevents structurally determined outcomes of individual 
calculations. In other words, although the platform provided basic structural 
elements for ordering the meaning-making activity of the traders, the process of 
framing these into a relevant frame of action was situational. Similarly, Fauré et al. 
(2010) has argued that it is the ongoing interactions among organizational 
participants in e.g. budgetary meetings that make ‘the organization’ present as a 
shared cognitive construct (‘the frame’); and as such it is continually subject to 
change depending on the participants situational use of organizational technologies 
such as accounting numbers. Building on this procedural approach to framing, a 
recent contribution by Lorino et al. (2017) has foregrounded “the dual nature of 
accounting numbers” as both generic models and singular events (p. 32). Their study 
illustrated that accounting numbers, such as a product margin, may be utilized by 
organizational participants “as a specific numerical value, with meaning rooted in a 
precise place at a precise moment” (ibid, p. 43), while also denoting a model for 
understanding and expressing organizational activities in economic syntax. 
Specifically, Lorino et al. (2017) analyze how frame-shifting occurs between multiple 
frames within a given situation. The availability of these frames, and their situated 
enactment, lead the authors to conclude that accounting numbers “act as mediators 
between a singular situation and socially-constructed, generic classes of meaning” in 
situated utilizations (ibid, p. 32; cf. Vollmer, 2007).  
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That accounting can be both structural (generic, circulated) and procedural (enacted, 
situated) speaks to a long-recognized analytical tension between situational and trans-
situational framing processes. For while framing takes place in interactions and the 
resultant frames are by definition situated achievements, particular understandings 
(frames) seemingly perpetuate across multiple sites of interaction (Cornelissen & 
Werner, 2014; Stokes & Hewitt, 1976; Vollmer, 2007). In this paper, our purpose is 
to conceptually elaborate on mechanisms for spatio-temporally distributed 
instantiations of shared understanding.  
There are commonly multiple frames at work in a particular interaction, posing an 
organisational challenge for interacting participants to reach a shared understanding 
of the situation. To conceptualise how such organisation of meaning-making occurs, 
Goffman has introduced the term cue to denote when different frames are to be 
activated (1974, p. 45).6 For example, Skærbæk (2005) characterizes the accounting 
language as a cue for when the reader should interpret numbers denoting resources 
spent on educating students in a university’s annual report through a financial frame, 
rather than a pedagogical frame. Which frame is in operation is significant: one 
interprets a ‘high’ number as positive, while ‘the same’ figure is negative in the other 
frame. However, we would like to underscore that while cues are interaction devices 
in ongoing framing (‘activating’ particular frames), they also remain as structural 
traces of past framing by virtue of their material character. As has been noted by 
Fauré et al., “accounting interactions lead to the creation of texts, which come to act 
across space and time, as the accounting numbers become part of future 
interactions” (2010, p. 1255). This is analytically consistent with observations made in 
other streams of accounting scholarship: particular key words or attributional 
statements in financial reports “provide both the content of valued company 
characteristics and the appropriate cues for interpreting them” (Aerts, 2005, p. 515; 
see also e.g. Clatworthy & Jones, 2003; Henry, 2008; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). It 
suggests a dual role for accounting: activating certain frames of organizational 
performance in specific sites of interaction, while also providing structural traces of 
such framing work that can circulate across sites. We argue that cue is a first part of 
an elaborated conceptual vocabulary to make sense of observations of spatio-
temporal distribution of shared understanding in prior studies of accounting.7 In the 
                                                
6 Two terms – cues and keys – are used by Goffman to discuss changes in frames. While the 
terms are at times used interchangeably, we understand keys to transpose between different 
frame tonalities (for example make-believe, contests or practicing for something, as outlined 
in Goffman, 1974, p. 74). In the accounting field, the use of financial numbers as detached 
calculative properties has been analysed as a form of frame tonality (see Vollmer, 2007). This 
differs from cues, which signal when frames (including changes in tonality) are to be 
activated (Goffman, 1974, p. 45). 
7 There are analytically important distinctions between our chosen concept of ‘cue’, and 
another influential concept in the accounting literature: ‘circulating reference’ (see Latour, 
1999). The former was developed within an epistemologically constructivist tradition that 
privileges human agency and cognition. It has been used to address questions related to 
individual’s and group’s situated construction of meaning. The latter concept, which stems 
from an ontological constructivist tradition that problematizes the status of human agency, 
has been used to address the role of inscriptions in enabling action at a distance. Thus, while 
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context of the present study, the term cue sensitizes us to the significance of 
particular numbers, words and phrases in the ongoing writing and revision of a 
financial report. These formulations are understood as expressions of situated 
meaning-making in the organization, and as means to circulate a precise 
understanding of organizational performance to other actors across time and space. 
However, a cue does not automatically instantiate a particular framing. It provides 
only a partial tool for “exploring how the contours of a frame, or rather a set of 
framings, are actually constructed and negotiated in context by actors” (Cornelissen 
& Werner, 2014, p. 219). As participants work to achieve a shared understanding in 
interactions, it is necessary to establish a common basis as to what is part of the 
(emergent) frame and what is not. Goffman (1974) introduced the term anchoring to 
conceptualise how participants relate a frame to the environing world in which the 
framing occurs (p. 248). A basic function of the process of anchoring is to bind and 
delimit the framed activity or objects from the rest of the world. It allows 
participants to fit their understandings of where the claims of the ongoing world 
leave off and where the claims of the frame take over in the situation. These 
contours or rims of enacted frames are constantly in a state of flux in the ongoing 
interaction as participants strive for precision in their meaning-making: 
The	 very	 points	 at	 which	 the	 internal	 activity	 leaves	 off	 and	 the	 external	
activity	 takes	over	–	 the	 rim	of	 the	 frame	 itself	–	become	generalized	by	 the	
[participants]	 and	 taken	 into	 [their]	 framework	 of	 interpretation,	 thus	
becoming,	 recursively,	 an	 additional	 part	 of	 the	 frame.	 In	 general,	 then,	 the	
assumptions	that	cut	an	activity	off	from	the	external	surround	also	mark	the	
ways	 in	 which	 this	 activity	 is	 inevitably	 bound	 to	 the	 surrounding	 world	
(Goffman,	1974,	p.	249).	
Anchoring is thus the process that establishes relationships and linkages in framing 
processes, even in the cases when the relationship established is that of a demarcated 
border of what the interaction is not. In this way, anchoring is also the process 
whereby participants order multiple elements into a coherent framing. The study by 
Beunza and Garud (2007) of financial analysts’ work to interpret the company 
Amazon.com provides an example. One element of framing Amazon.com, enacted 
by the analysts to understand the company, was a categorisation: Amazon.com as an 
‘Internet company’. A second element was an analogy, i.e. Amazon.com is similar to 
the company Dell. A third element was the accounting metric ‘revenues’. By 
anchoring Amazon.com to each of these elements, the analysts in the Beunza and 
Garud (2007) study achieved a delimited “calculative frame” that enabled a 
collectively shared valuation of the company to be performed (ibid, p. 14). 
Consequently, anchoring allows for structural elements of frames (signified by cues 
in e.g. analyst reports or other accounting texts) to be theorised in terms of a 
processual analysis of framing. We argue that anchoring provides the second part of a 
conceptual vocabulary that opens for an understanding of the spatio-temporal 
achievement of shared meaning, thereby answering a recent call “to study the 
                                                                                                                                 
there is a degree of conceptual overlap in the two terms, they address different analytical 
questions and emphasize different parts of social reality. 
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ongoing and interpretive processes of framing and meaning construction across 
actors and across time” (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014, p. 219). In this study, the 
concept of anchoring directs attention to how the quarterly reporting work linked the 
case organization’s overall financial performance, including dimensions of this 
performance such as capital position, to specific numbers, operations, and analyst 
expectations into a coherent and plausible frame. The concept of cues, meanwhile, 
denotes the structural traces of frames – the choice of words and phrases – that are 
enrolled within framing processes and circulated across sites of interaction. 
3. Research method and the context of investor relations 
in the financial reporting process 
3.1 Study design 
Previous studies of preparers’ financial reporting practices have been based on 
interviews and analysis of public documents. To date, these methodological choices 
have arguably contributed to what Hatherly, Leung and MacKenzie (2008) have 
characterized as an indirect understanding of the social processes involved in financial 
reporting. The present study was designed to amend this lack of direct accounts of 
how members of preparer organisations work to make financial numbers take on a 
certain meaning. 
The investor relations function was deemed to be a fruitful entry point for such a 
study, as IR professionals are involved in work that explicitly attends to enabling the 
production and circulation of numbers that make claims to financial representations 
of companies’ past performance and future prospects (Holland, 1998; Rao & 
Sivakumar, 1999; Useem, 1993). Indeed, IR is often charged with the ultimate 
responsibility for the publication of quarterly and annual reports under the 
supervision of the Chief Financial Officer (Brown, Call, Clement, & Sharp, in press). 
In a stylized financial reporting process, the investor relations function is involved in 
the work which take place after accountants have produced financial numbers (Barker 
& Schulte, 2017; Huikku et al., 2017) and their audit (Johed & Catasús, 2018; 
Pentland, 1993), yet before corporate managers present the final report in public and 
private meetings with capital market actors (Abraham & Bamber, 2017; Roberts et 
al., 2006; Solomon et al., 2013). 
The case company, BigBank,8 was identified based on two main criteria. First, the 
company was large in terms of financial market capitalization. At the time of the 
study, its market value was in excess of 75 billion Euro, making it one of the twenty 
largest banks in Europe. Second, the company was listed on an established stock 
exchange. Together, these two criteria ensured that the company had multiple 
institutional investors and was followed by a variety of equity and credit analysts and 
other market information intermediaries. This meant that there was recurrent 
interaction with capital market actors with an interest in BigBank’s financial numbers, 
                                                
8 BigBank is a pseudonym used to ensure anonymity of the organization and informants. 
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and a dedicated IR team to undertake work across a broad spectrum of financial 
reporting. From the outset, the intention was to undertake a process-based study of 
the backstage work of the BigBank IR function. In this investigation, our 
methodological strategy was to follow mundane work. Given the dearth of detailed 
studies from within preparer organizations, this approach was initially deemed more 
productive than the otherwise common strategy to investigate the taken-for-granted 
through instances of controversy. The approach also proved appropriate, as the 
participants in the study did not perceive that the studied quarterly reporting cycle 
involved any surprises that required non-routine handling. A consequence of the 
chosen methodological strategy and empirical circumstances is that the case 
description is characterized by accounts of continuity and stability. 
3.2 The BigBank organization and the work of its investor 
relations function 
BigBank is a large Northern European bank with more than 25,000 employees in 
several countries. They are a universal bank, which means that their operations 
include the provision of banking services, cash management services, corporate 
finance, trade finance services, investment management, life insurance, pension 
schemes, private banking, investment funds and online trading services. BigBank was 
at the time of study formally managed by a group of six individuals: the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), the Chief Risk Officer 
(CRO), and three business area managers. Together, these individuals were known as 
the senior management. 
The IR team in BigBank was formally a part of the CFO-office and consisted of five 
members: the Head of IR, the Senior investor relations officer (IRO), the IRO, the 
IT IRO, and the Coordinator. The work of the IR team was defined by the quarterly 
reporting cycle (Blomberg, Kjellberg, & Winroth, 2012, pp. 69-71) of BigBank. The 
time line for this cycle is outlined in Diagram 1: 
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Diagram 1: Time line of the BigBank quarterly reporting cycle 
 
The start of the quarterly reporting cycle is known as the silent period. This refers to 
the weeks leading up to the public release of the quarterly report. In accordance with 
the company’s stock listing agreement, all financial communication is suspended 
while the members of the IR team write the quarterly report and its associated 
documents. Various security measures are taken during the silent period to prevent 
information leaks. Notably, the executive floor, which houses the offices of senior 
management, the IR team and a select few of top ranking managers at the bank, is 
sealed off. The restricted area was jokingly referred to as ‘the cage’ by the IR team, as 
it was physically separate from the rest of the organization. 
During each silent period, the activities of the BigBank IR team is centred around 
crafting four documents: The Report (henceforth also ‘the quarterly report’) is the 
formal document issued by BigBank in which the company’s performance for the 
previous quarter is presented by a mix of numerical, graphical and textual means. The 
presentation and content of the financial statements in the Report are regulated by 
financial reporting standards. There is also extensive regulation concerning when and 
how the Report is publicly disclosed. The Presentation is used by the CEO and CFO to 
communicate BigBank’s quarterly performance at the investor conference call 
presentation. The Q&A is a document that lists all (expected) potential questions 
investors and analysts might have regarding the numbers in the Report. These 
questions are developed by members of the IR team, based on their experience and 
knowledge about the individuals that make out the investor community. It also lists 
approved answers and internal reasoning around specific financial numbers in the 
Report. The Q&A document is strictly for internal use by individuals interacting with 
capital market actors. The Fact Book is a public document which can best be likened 
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to an encyclopaedia of financial and operational facts up until the current quarter. It 
includes a five-year history for a number of metrics, which is provided in Excel 
format as a service to analysts who can copy-paste numbers from the spreadsheet 
into commonly used valuation models. 
The silent period is followed by the quarterly roadshow period. This starts on the day 
that the quarterly report is released and continues for a few weeks. During the 
quarterly roadshow period senior management travels with the IR team to meet and 
present the quarterly result to investors and analysts around the world. The 
Presentation and the Q&A, described above, are key documents used throughout 
this period at various investor meetings, including so called roadshows, where 
investor meetings take place off-site and are organized and hosted by an investment 
bank. Once the quarterly roadshow period is ended, there is an intermediate period 
of ‘business as usual’ until the next silent period begins.  
3.3 Data collection 
BigBank was formally approached with a request to participate in the study in 
December 2012 through a letter addressed to the Head of IR by name. This letter 
was then followed up by a phone call a few weeks later in which a variety of practical 
and substantive questions about the study and its undertaking were posed by the 
Head of IR and answered. Finally, a personal meeting with the Head of IR was 
arranged where the study was presented to the company. The company formally 
agreed to participate in the study in February 2013. Data collection commenced in 
March 2013 and closed in June 2014. The data presented in this paper covers a two-
month period centred around one quarterly report release date in 2013.  
In line with the primary analytical interest in social interactions, direct observation 
was the main empirical method (Goffman, 1959, 1974, 1989; Samra-Fredericks & 
Bargiela-Chiappini, 2008). Shadowing individual members of the IR team of BigBank 
allowed for observations of how specific financial numbers were discussed and 
interpreted in a range of settings (Czarniawska, 2007). In this paper, we draw on 
material from a total of 93 hours of observations, primarily during one of BigBank’s 
quarterly report cycles. As summarized in Table 1, observations were made across a 
range of sites within the organization and external events. The 71 hours of 
observation of internal work within BigBank included observations of the writing of 
the quarterly report at corporate headquarters and meetings between managers and 
the IR team. The remaining 22 hours of observations were made at investor 
presentations of the quarterly result with corresponding questions and answers 
sessions by senior management, and other external events such as the BigBank 
capital markets day, annual general meeting, and roadshow meetings with investors 
that situated the quarterly financial reporting work within a broader context of capital 
market interaction. Notes of observations were taken continuously in real time and 
any gaps in note taking were complemented from memory at the earliest 
convenience.   
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Table 1: Collected data on BigBank quarterly reporting cycle 
Total time observed 93 hrs 
Of which internal work 71 hrs 
Of which external work 22 hrs 
Number of interviews 11 
Average duration of interviews 63 min 
Total number of documents collected 333 
Of which internal 26 
Of which external (excl. analyst reports) 57 
Of which analyst reports 250 
As a complement to the direct observations, recurring formal interviews were also 
held with the five-person BigBank IR team. In total, eleven one-hour interviews were 
held with these five individuals between April 2013 and June 2014. The formal 
interviews provided a structured means for probing the cognitive universe of these 
individuals. The interviews were semi-structured. Interviewees were asked to reflect 
on broader themes in the IR work and recount specific details of the quarterly 
reporting cycle that is the focus of the present paper. All interviews were digitally 
recorded and transcribed. In addition to the formal interviews, the first author posed 
numerous informal questions to the BigBank IR professionals in connection with 
observations. While these exchanges were not recorded, both the questions and 
responses were noted down in the observation notes.  
A final source of empirical material was internal and public documents. A total of 
333 documents were collected. Most of these documents (250 in total), were 
published financial analyst reports on BigBank which were accessed via the 
Thompson Investext research database. The analyst reports were used to trace the 
capital market community’s understanding of BigBank’s performance throughout the 
16 months of the study. A further 57 documents collected were publicly available 
documents such as quarterly and annual reports, investor presentation material, the 
fact book of financial numbers and other outputs of the BigBank financial reporting. 
Finally, 26 internal documents were also collected. These documents notably 
included a succession of drafts of the final, publicly released, quarterly report, 
material prepared for investor meetings, as well as material about the proposed 
financial communication for approval by the Board of Directors. These internal 
documents were used as a part of the method of direct observation, inspired by ideas 
in ethnomethodology, in which documents externalises and leaves a lasting trace of 
particular conditions, interpretations and local historical contexts of their production 
and use (Garfinkel, 1967; Smith, 1984). Thus, the internal documents serve as more 
than background for the study; they form a core part of the analysis, together with 
direct observations of interaction and interviews.  
3.4 Data analysis and presentation 
The data analysis was conducted by ordering the material in four iterations. The first 
ordering of the material was temporal – when? – such that the three sources of 
empirical material (observations, interviews and documents) could be matched up in 
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a chronology of unfolding events. The second ordering of material was situational – 
where? – so that empirical material related to different sites of interactions were 
linked. This structuring of the data is evident in the following case description, which 
presents interactions during the silent period that involved at least one member of 
the IR team and where the meaning of financial numbers was discussed.  
The third ordering of material was numerical – what? – where the data material was 
grouped in relation to a few specific metrics based on empirical occurrence, and 
more importantly, recurrence. Such an ordering enabled a subsequent granular 
analysis of the (re-)framing work of these numbers across situations of interaction. In 
the following account we highlight the framing work of the Core Tier 1 ratio. Briefly, 
the Core Tier 1 ratio is a number that is ascribed central importance in the European 
regulation of financial institutions. Notably, it is one of the cornerstones on 
minimum capital requirements for banks.9 This metric is calculated as the ratio 
between the sum of a bank’s common equity and disclosed reserves (numerator) and 
its risk-weighted assets in the balance sheet (denominator).10 The metric was chosen 
as an anchor for our narrative due to its empirical richness. 
Our fourth and final ordering of the material was analytical – how? – and guided by 
the chosen conceptual framework. Building on the theoretical positioning, we also 
chose to structure the empirical account as strips of activity. The term strip refers “to 
any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity” (Goffman, 1974, p. 
10). A strip is not a naturally occurring division of the flow of activity; rather, it 
denotes “any raw batch of occurrences (of whatever status in reality) that one wants 
to draw attention to as a starting point for analysis” (ibid., p. 10). The case 
description thus presents a series of strips, based on a combination of material from 
of observations, interview responses and extracts from documents. It is to this 
account that we now turn. 
4. Production of meaning: The iterative framing of 
BigBank’s quarterly performance 
We enter BigBank’s IR group on the closing date of the quarter, which marks the 
beginning of the silent period. The quarterly report will be released in less than three 
weeks, and the first visible steps to craft this Report and its attendant documents 
now begins. However, writing the new Report does not start with a blank page – but 
rather with the preceding interim report: 
                                                
9 These capital requirements are set out in the Basel II and the new Basel III frameworks by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS 2006, pp. 12ff, BCBS 2010, pp. 12ff). 
The Basel II was adopted into European legislation by Capital Requirements Directives 
(2006/48 and 2006/49) and replaced by Basel III in the legislative package of Directive 
(2013/36) and Regulation (No 575/2013). Available 2018-10-10 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/regcapital/legislation-in-force/index_en.htm. 
10 BCBS, 2006, pp. 12ff. 
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4.1 “Insert number here”: Starting from a skeleton structure of 
cues  
The BigBank IR team’s first working document that outlined a skeleton frame for the 
presentation of financial results in the Report and the Presentation did not include 
any actual figures from the Group Finance function. Rather, the preceding quarter’s 
report was stripped of its numerical content and “X” or similar placeholders inserted 
for the as-yet-unknown arithmetic quantities (Diagram 2).11 Thus, already in the first 
days of the silent period, there was an initial framing of specific performance metrics. 
Both the selection of these metrics and the surrounding text were effectively 
reproductions of the preceding quarter. The Core Tier 1 ratio, for example, was 
positioned in relation to cues such as “strong capital generation”, “reduc[tion of] the 
risk-weighted assets” and “a positive outcome” for pending approvals12.  
Diagram 2: Early framing of Core Tier 1 ratio (reproduced from internal Report draft 2, p. 2, 
paragraph 8; redactions added) 
 
The practice of using the previous quarter’s report as scaffolding for the new quarter 
was explicitly acknowledged by IR team members as helpful for ensuring consistency 
in how financial numbers were framed over time. Maintaining such consistency was 
considered important for appropriately managing and stabilizing capital market 
actors’ “expectations picture” over time, as the Head of IR explained:  
In	 such	 a	 large	 and	 low	 risk	 bank	 as	 [BigBank]	 there	 are	 never	 any	 dramatic	
changes	in	expectations	from	one	quarter	to	another,	rather	it	is	x-percent	up	
or	down,	which	 is	 an	 advantage	because	 then	each	quarter	we	 can	 calibrate	
this,	 the	expectations	picture	 [….].	Because	what	we	do	not	want	 is	 that	one	
moment	the	analysts	think	that	we	will	make	a	hundred,	the	next	that	we	will	
make	eighty,	 or	 a	hundred	and	 ten.	A	hundred	and	 ten	 is	 better	 than	eighty	
but	neither	is	good	because	it	creates	uncertainty	of	what	[BigBank]	will	make,	
                                                
11 Our methodological focus on interactions involving the BigBank IR team scopes out the 
production of arithmetic elements by the Group Finance function (cf. Huikku et al., 2017). 
However, as we shall see in subsequent sections, these two processes eventually merged in 
the final stages of the silent period. 
12 The pending approvals referred to the implementation of the (then) new Basel III 
regulation, which required regulatory sign-off on the bank’s internal models for calculating 
risk-weighted assets. 
BigBank
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what	the	earnings	capacity	really	is.	So	again,	what	we	want	is	to	be	the	large	
safe	stable	alternative	and	therefore	we	work	in	this	transparency.	(Head	of	IR)	
Using words and phrases which had been carefully crafted to enact a precise framing 
of the financial number during past interactions in past quarterly reporting cycles was 
a way to make BigBank recognizable as “the large safe stable alternative”. Recycling 
these words and phrases put in place cues for re-activating previously enacted frames 
in new situations.  
Another input in the early efforts at framing BigBank’s quarterly performance was a 
few aggregated group financial numbers provided by the Group Finance function.13 
The Head of IR and the Senior IRO sat down on the second day of the silent period 
to sketch out an overarching message that incorporated these actual figures. As the 
Senior IRO emphasized, the actuals were also cues for the construction of meaning 
about BigBank’s performance: “That is after all the final product, although one might 
have some question marks about what it is that has driven it”. In this early meeting 
between the two senior IR members, the Senior IRO noted that part of deciding how 
to draft the message was to cross-reference the arithmetic values of the aggregated 
financial numbers with internal ideas about performance and external predictions: 
“We check if [the actuals] appear to be true in relation to what [the IR team] thinks 
and what the expectations the market has, what estimates they have on the Q3 
result”. This early anchoring of the actual figures in relation to both internal and 
external frames would be followed by additional efforts to both contextualize and 
situate BigBank’s performance. With a first, IR-internally message in place, the 
participants in interactions around the quarterly financial numbers rapidly swelled to 
include senior members of the BigBank organization. In these subsequent 
interactions during the observed reporting cycle, we can follow how alignments and 
adjustments were made to the (structural) traces of previous framing processes. 
4.2 Framing an overarching message in relation to 
circulating cues: The storytelling meeting decides to 
“deliver” on performance 
The so-called storytelling meeting, held on day 3 of the silent period, was attended by 
the entire BigBank senior management team, as well as the Head of IR, and the 
Heads of the Group Finance function and the Group Strategy and Business Control 
function. The purpose of the meeting was to agree on an overarching message for 
the quarter’s financial result, in relation to which specific performance metrics in the 
report could be positioned. 
The meeting began with a presentation of the aggregate result numbers by the Head 
of Group Finance, followed by the presentation of an early sketch of the storyline 
for these numbers by the Head of IR. The Senior IRO noted that any storyline for 
the Report at this stage of the silent period was a moving target, as many actual 
values were either unknown or could change. Despite the lack of certainty, notably 
                                                
13 The first financial information was sent to the Head of IR and the Senior IRO by the 
Group Finance function towards the end of day 1 of the silent period. 
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about capital development, he explained that the storytelling meeting nevertheless 
served as important guidance for the IR team’s work: 
So	we	had	a	bit	 about	 the	 view	on	 the	 income,	on	 the	 result,	 on	 the	 capital	
development	and	so	on.	Actually,	the	capital	number	is	not	entirely	certain	yet,	
but	on	the	things	we	know.	[Head	of	IR]	brought	the	proposal	to	the	meeting.	
At	 the	 meeting	 there	 was	 not	 so	 much	 discussion,	 rather	 they	 took	 it	 and	
thought	 it	 was	 OK	 –	 as	 long	 as	 it	 did	 not	 change,	 based	 on	 this	 first	 initial	
information.	But	it	can	be	a	lot	of	discussion,	it	depends	on	how	uncertain	it	is	
–	 or	 how	 surprising	 it	 is.	 So	 they	 discussed	 [the	 proposal]	 at	 the	 meeting	
yesterday,	 and	 based	 on	 that	 [the	 IR	 team	 members]	 continue	 our	 work.	
(Senior	IRO)	
The proposal put to the storytelling meeting by the Head of IR incorporated words 
and phrases used in recent financial analyst reports’ on BigBank (Diagram 3). A 
highlighted issue was that many of these reports framed BigBank’s “ability to 
distribute capital” as an important dimension of financial performance, due to the 
(then) on-going implementation of the Basel III framework. This regulation 
mandated changes in how the Core Tier 1 ratio was calculated. Analysts’ “calculative 
frames” (Beunza & Garud, 2007) directly linked this metric to the amount of equity 
available for distribution to BigBank shareholders in the form of dividends. The IR 
team’s proposal was therefore that a focus area in the Report should incorporate this 
cue, as it would aid in framing forthcoming interactions with capital market actors. 
(As elaborated on below, however, this was not agreed on with the storytelling 
meeting participants.)  
Diagram 3: Proposal to consider capital market concern with dividends and regulatory 
impact on metrics used to calculate Core Tier 1 ratio (reproduced from internal briefing by 
Head of IR at storytelling meeting, p. 2; redactions added) 
 
The Head of IR also showed a slide comparing so called ‘actuals’ with ‘preliminary 
consensus’ for a number of financial metrics. While those discussed in the 
storytelling meeting referred to items on the income statement, this type of 
arithmetic comparison was a recurrent part of the framing of numbers during the 
silent period. Notably, various interviewees indicated that comparisons were 
consequential for how the sentences surrounding specific numbers in the Report 
were phrased; the cues used by BigBank should be aligned with those articulated in 
prevailing capital market frames.  
BigBank
BigBank
BigBank
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The early interactions concerning the framing of BigBank’s quarterly performance 
thus crafted links to both phrases and arithmetic values which were already in 
circulation among the intended audience of investors and analysts. In addition to 
analyst reports, one source of such circulating numbers (Vollmer, Mennicken, & 
Preda, 2009) was the so-called Financial Plan 2015, which set out arithmetic targets 
for various metrics in the coming three years. The report had been communicated as 
BigBank’s targets to capital market actors and provided an anchoring for the new 
quarter figures. According to members of the IR team, the production of any key 
numeric representation of BigBank’s financial performance during the quarter had to 
link to the levels and targets of the number in the Financial Plan 2015. 
	[T]he	‘Financial	Plan	2015’	was	presented	on	the	capital	markets	day	in	March	
2013,	 so	 it’s	around	 for	 three	years	now	….	 [I]n	principle	 this	 is	what	applies	
now	for	three	years	and	what	one	should	follow	up	on.	That	is	our	simple	view	
on	things	–	and	it	is	the	investors’	view	on	things	too	–	if	management	and	the	
company	 committed	 themselves	 to	 the	 plan,	 then	 that	 is	 what	 one	 should	
follow	up	on.	(Senior	IRO)	
In the case of the Core Tier 1 ratio, the communicated target was for it to be 
maintained above 13%. This and other specific arithmetic targets and analyst 
forecasts, together with established narratives in the investment community and in 
previous quarterly reporting, provided a skeleton structure of cues and a delimitation 
of context for corporate representatives in their work to establish an overall framing 
of BigBank’s Q3 financial performance.  
When the storytelling meeting ended, an initial frame had been articulated. The 
proposed interpretational schema for BigBank’s Q3 performance was cued by the 
title of the second draft of the Report: Delivery on costs, capital and credit quality. 
The notion of ‘delivery’ in relation to three financial dimensions linked to the results 
of the comparison of specific values for the Core Tier 1 ratio and a smaller number 
of additional metrics. Delivery on capital alluded to the Core Tier 1 ratio level, which 
would be “somewhere above 14%” for the quarter (although the exact level was 
unknown at the time of the meeting). This outcome was above the target level of 
13%, and also exceeded the Q2 value (14.0%) and the previous year’s Q3 value 
(12.2%). Delivery on credit quality, meanwhile, was represented by Net Loan Losses.14 
The initial choice to deliver on cost rather than income was prompted by the report that 
Total Operating Income would be lower than the preliminary consensus for Q3, 
below the reported Q2 level, and only marginally higher than the previous year’s Q3. 
This meant that this financial performance metric was not in line with the stated 
target of “income initiatives” which would lead to increases.15 
                                                
14 The first internal Q3 figures for Net Loan Losses put them at 171 MEUR, which was 
lower than the preliminary consensus version of 182 MEUR, as well as lower than Q2 (186 
MEUR) and the previous year’s Q3 (236 MEUR). This development put it in line with the 
target-frame of “improving”. 
15 Later during the silent period, this decision was revisited, and the final report headline did 
state that BigBank was ‘delivering’ on income, but an income figure net of currency effects 
that showed the targeted trajectory.  
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The ‘delivery’ concept, which had emerged in interactions between the IR team and 
senior management, provided a strong cue for how to shape subsequent interactions 
around specific numbers within the already drafted and cue-laden structure of the 
quarterly reporting documents. However, in the next (temporal) phase of the silent 
period, the efforts to produce an account of BigBank’s financial performance took 
on a different character. Rather than focusing on circulating cues and aggregate 
figures, as in the lead up to the storytelling meeting, we traced the IR team’s 
extensive anchoring of figures through interactions with individuals within various 
functions, business areas and geographical regions of the organization. As elaborated 
on in the next section, we understand this anchoring as attempts to flesh out the 
overall frame by linking aggregate numbers to operational settings and more 
disaggregated numbers. In this process, the aggregated financial numbers served as 
something of a circular referent for framing the performance of BigBank: the 
arithmetic levels of the actual numbers would set the baseline for the tone in the 
Report (cf. Allee & Deangelis, 2015; Henry, 2008), but explaining these outcomes 
and linking them to a certain economic reality in terms of BigBank’s performance 
and future prospects were as-yet-incomplete parts of the framing process. 
4.3 Anchoring ‘Delivery on capital’: The characterization of 
Core Tier 1 ratio development in the Report 
Following the storytelling meeting, the work of the IR team shifted to interactions 
with various parts of BigBank’s operations to gauge if the arithmetic and 
interpretative parts of the emergent framing of quarterly performance held up: 
	[R]ight	now	we	are	in	an	early	phase	and	we	have	just	understood	the	group	
result,	 but	we	are	not	 certain	on	all	 the	driving	 forces.	We	do	not	 know,	 for	
example,	 the	 volume	 development	 in	 all	 segments,	 we	 have	 not	 got	 that	
compiled.	So	you	start	in	this	way	and	hope	that	you	have	the	right	analysis	or	
that	 you	 have	 the	 right	 background	 material	 so	 you	 can	 do	 the	 analysis	
anyway.	 Then	 we	 start	 to	 confirm	 it,	 the	 first	 step	 now	 is	 that	 we	 get	 the	
business	 areas’	material	 and	get	 in	 the	 last	 numbers.	We	will	 probably	 get	 a	
balance	sheet	[for	the	group]	tomorrow	too,	for	example.	(Senior	IRO)	
To delve into the drivers and component parts of specific numbers, the IR team 
engaged with individuals from various units within the bank. A recurrent request was 
for disaggregated numbers and additional accounts of how to understand a specific 
number. These were discussed within the IR team, before any supplied material was 
entered into the Report and the Presentation. The exchanges between IR team 
members and the BigBank operations typically took place on an ad hoc basis, either 
as two-way conversations or meetings in smaller groups, and prompted multiple 
iterations of the four quarterly report documents.  
The anchoring of the Core Tier 1 ratio revolved around seemingly minute changes in 
which cues were used to enact a specific positioning of this number within the 
broader framing of BigBank’s ‘delivery’ of quarterly performance. The following 
dialogue between the BigBank Chief Risk Officer (CRO), the Head of Capital and 
the Senior IRO in a meeting on capital ratios concerned the credit quality of the loan 
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portfolio underlying the risk-weighted assets in the Core Tier 1 ratio. The issue at 
stake was how ‘stable’ this performance was, and this assessment required extensive 
contextualization: 
CRO:	Are	we	on	plan	with	what	we	said	on	the	[Capital	Markets	Day]?	
Head	of	Capital:	No,	we	are	not	because	[lengthy	explanation	involving	various	
internal	 numbers	 and	 attendant	 explanations	 for	 these	 arithmetic	 levels	 and	
their	interrelationship].	
CRO:	OK,	then	I	suggest	that	we	specify	in	the	report	that	–	instead	of	what	we	
write	now;	 ‘migration	 is	 largely	 stable	 for	both	 corporate	and	households’;	 –	
we	write	 ‘migration	 is	overall	 stable	but	negative	on	 the	one	and	positive	on	
the	other’.	
Senior	 IRO:	 Yes,	 but	 in	Q2	we	 said	 ‘stable	 effects	 from	migration’	 in	 both,	 it	
could	be	good	to	stick	to	that	message?	
CRO:	OK,	let	us	keep	it	as	it	is.		
Traces of the anchoring of the Core Tier 1 ratio can be found in the succession of 
drafts of the Report, where small changes were made to the cues used to frame this 
metric. The intensive work of the IR team, and the numerous interactions with 
members of the BigBank organization, centred on finding the ‘right’ cue structure to 
make the number intelligible and representative of a certain organisational reality. 
Minute changes in wording were perceived to have formative framing effects, since 
these structural traces of the framing process provided cues for future re-enactment 
of specific frames among the capital market actors.  
A first version of the cue structure of the Core Tier 1 ratio in the Report was 
completed immediately following the storytelling meeting with senior management 
(Diagram 4). As previously mentioned, this meeting agreed on the overarching 
message for BigBank’s quarterly performance, which included the cue ‘Delivery on 
capital’. While an abstract placeholder remained for the arithmetic value (and change) 
of the Core Tier 1 ratio, the metric had improved because of certain developments 
(‘strong capital generation’, ‘low volume growth’) and BigBank was ‘delivering’ on its 
initiatives (targeted as ‘cost efficiency’). 
Diagram 4: Initial wording in the paragraph on Core Tier 1 ratio in the preamble of the 
Report (reproduction of internal Report draft 2, p. 1, paragraph 2) 
 
Already a few days later, following interactions such as that between the CRO and 
Head of Capital recounted above, the cue structure in the third draft of the Report 
was slightly altered (Diagram 5). While Core Tier 1 ratio had improved, this was now 
linked to ‘strict volume prioritisation’ rather than ‘low volume growth’. The timing of 
when initiatives were delivering was also amended, with reference to the future 
(‘going forward’) removed. 
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Diagram 5: Revised wording in the paragraph on Core Tier 1 ratio in the preamble of the 
Report (reproduction of internal Report draft 3, p. 1, paragraph 2)  
 
Interviewees described how these changes in wording – in particular that of ‘low 
volume growth’ to ‘strict volume prioritisation’ – came after interactions with other 
units in the bank led the IR team to conclude that the improvement of Core Tier 1 
ratio was not simply an effect (in the form of low volume growth) but could be traced 
to efforts within the bank (at volume prioritisation). This illustrates how the process of 
anchoring the aggregate financial numbers in relation to an organizational context 
shaped the emergent frame. And while the change in the cue structure of this specific 
number might seem trivial to an outside observer, in the context of the BigBank 
quarterly reporting cycle it was deemed material enough to warrant a briefing of 
senior management by the Head of IR. At this briefing, which took place in a 
meeting held the week following the storytelling meeting, he showed the following 
slide (Diagram 6): 
Diagram 6: Proposed change in the wording of the paragraph on Core Tier 1 ratio in the 
preamble of the Report (reproduction of internal briefing by Head of IR at senior 
management meeting, p. 4, paragraph 2) 
 
The senior management approved the changes to the cue structure. In a subsequent 
draft that was sent to the BigBank Board of Directors towards the end of the silent 
period, this phrasing was paired with the arithmetic level of the metric which was 
(finally) fixed. The Core Tier 1 ratio for Q3 could be entered as 14.4% in place of the 
long-standing 14.X%, and an increase of 2.2% replaced 2.X%.  
Yet the framing of Core Tier 1 ratio did not stop with the stabilization of its numeric 
value. At a late stage in the silent period, the Board decided to once again change the 
formulation in the Report: from ‘strict volume prioritisation’ to ‘strict volume 
discipline’. It was this cue that was used to frame the Core Tier 1 ratio in the 
published Report (Diagram 7): 
Diagram 7: Final wording in the paragraph on Core Tier 1 Ratio in the preamble of the 
published Report (reproduction of published Report, p. 1, paragraph 2) 
 
Rather than a clear sequence from number to narrative or narrative to number, the 
example of the Core Tier 1 ratio exemplifies the successive, iterative and interlinked 
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emergence of specific numeric values and their characterization and explanation. The 
example of the Core Tier 1 ratio also illustrates the role of anchoring in 
substantiating the overall frame by linking specific numbers to operational settings 
and more disaggregated numbers. 
4.4 Delimiting the frame: The Core Tier 1 ratio in the Q&A 
document 
In addition to elaborating a cue structure in the Report, the IR team also worked on 
cues in quarterly reporting documents intended for use in specific sites of subsequent 
capital market interaction. The Q&A document, which was intended for internal use 
by senior managers and IR team members in conjunction with interactions with 
capital market actors, was the target of many revisions. The cues developed for the 
Q&A document included what interviewees described as more ambiguous 
characteristics of financial numbers, which we analytically understand as elements 
where further (internal) framing work was required to enact a certain frame in 
(external) interactions. Such characteristics were precisely what capital market actors 
were expected to ask questions about, since it mattered for the interpretation of key 
metrics. For this reason, it was widely understood to be important for BigBank 
representatives to have a precisely worded script that aligned with the overarching 
framing of performance and kept ambiguous elements outside the frame. 
For example, although the IR team had anticipated that capital market actors would 
interpret the quarter’s Core Tier 1 ratio in terms of BigBank’s near term dividend 
capacity (see Diagram 3, earlier), the participants in the storytelling meeting decided 
to omit any such cues in the Report.16 Rather than explicitly positioning the Core 
Tier 1 ratio in relation to dividend policy, this aspect of the Core Tier 1 ratio framing 
was instead to be handled through interactions at the conference call presentation 
and in subsequent investor meetings. The IR team anticipated that investors could 
approach the aspect from two different perspectives, and two versions of a response 
were therefore set out in the Q&A document to align the corporate response to how 
the investor participant framed their question. The first version was cued in relation 
to the Financial Plan and the financial targets BigBank had espoused at their capital 
markets day in the spring of 2013 (Diagram 8). 
                                                
16 There were two explanations that interviewees provided for this decision. The first was 
that it (still) remained unclear as to what precise level the Core Tier 1 ratio would be 
recalculated into when the new Basel III regulation, and the expected regulatory approval for 
the internal models for the calculation of risk-weighted assets, was in place. This in turn 
meant that there was no agreed view within BigBank on the arithmetic level of equity capital 
required to keep the Core Tier 1 ratio at the target level (as expressed in the Financial Plan 
2015), and thus the amount of equity capital available for dividends. A second explanation 
was that even though BigBank representatives had a fairly precise view of the new arithmetic 
level of the Core Tier 1 ratio under Basel III, they were still involved in internal discussions 
as to what it would mean if the Core Tier 1 ratio reached its target level. The discussion 
among the senior management was whether to pursue operational opportunities by investing 
or to pay out all accumulated excess capital. 
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Diagram 8: Dividend policy message in response to questions on the Financial Plan and 
targets (reproduced from Q&A final, p. 25, subsection Capital Policy) 
 
The second version incorporated cues related to regulatory concerns (Diagram 9).  
Diagram 9: Dividend policy message in response to questions on regulations (Reproduced 
from Q&A final, p. 26, subsection Capital, paragraph 1; redactions added)  
 
In this manner, a cue structure was articulated that could frame the Core Tier 1 ratio 
in interactions with capital market actors, following the release of the Report. 
However, it is notable that the answers set out in the Q&A are geared towards 
distancing the aspect of dividend policy from the Core Tier 1 ratio and delimiting out 
any mention of a specific dividend pay-out amount. 
4.5 Showtime! Attempting to enact the frame in interactions 
with capital market actors 
The Report was released at precisely 07.00 am (BigBank headquarter local time) on 
Q-day, when the IT investor relations officer punched the button on his keyboard to 
publish the document on BigBank’s corporate webpage. According to interviewees, 
releasing the Report well in advance of the opening of the stock market was 
supposed to gives investors and analysts time to read and interpret BigBank’s 
financial performance as it had been framed, before any trading took place. Q-day then 
progressed with a rapid succession of meetings and presentations, including a 10.00 
am press conference for the general media, followed by an exclusive lunch with the 
senior management and selected investors at corporate HQ. A key ingredient in this 
lunch meeting was the Presentation talk, which the CEO then also delivered on the 
international telephone conference in the afternoon. The participants on this call was 
a wider group of investors and analysts, joined on this occasion by an accounting 
researcher:  
The CEO began by evoking the overarching framing agreed on already in the 
storytelling meeting, two weeks prior: that BigBank was “delivering on the plan”. 
This abstract interpretation of BigBank’s performance was emphasized, while the 
report numbers which “you have all seen” were downplayed: 
Thank	you	very	much,	and	welcome	to	this	call.	We'll	do	it	briefly	because	by	
now	you	have	all	seen	the	numbers,	so	I	will	talk	a	little	about	our	plan	going	
forward.	 But	 the	 key	 message	 today	 is	 the	 reality	 that	 we	 are	 delivering	
according	 to	 our	 plan.	 (CEO	 at	 international	 telephone	 conference,	 authors’	
emphasis	added)	
In the above strip the CEO used the qualifier “the key message today” to introduce 
and establish the hitherto internal concept of ‘delivery’ in this interaction with capital 
market actors. While the term ‘delivery’ has a meaning in everyday use, in this setting 
BigBank BigBank
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it functioned as a cue for company-capital market interaction. In addition to the 
aforementioned emphasis, repetition (Henry, 2008) was also used to reinforce the 
cue, as can be seen in the continuation of the strip: 
Income	is	up,	costs	are	down,	RWAs
17
	are	down,	and	we	build	the	Core	Tier	1	
to	14.4%.	So,	all	in	all,	we	are	delivering	according	to	the	plan.	
So,	I	will	not	take	you	through	the	numbers,	but	rather	go	to	the	slides	where	
we	present	how	we	delivered	on	the	plan	and	give	a	bit	more	flavour	to	this,	
and	 this	 starts	 on	 page	 20,	 where	 we	 just	 reiterate	 our	 targets.	 (CEO	 at	
international	telephone	conference,	authors’	emphasis	added)	
While the ostensible purpose of the conference call was to present the quarterly 
numbers, the previous strips illustrate how the CEO’s interaction was geared towards 
conveying a particular understanding of the numbers: they were “delivering on the 
plan”. The Core Tier 1 ratio value of 14.4% was the only specific numeric value that 
the CEO mentioned. Later during the telephone conference, the framing of this 
financial number was further elaborated on through references to corporate targets, 
specific regional conditions and regulatory requirements. The quarter’s Core Tier 1 
ratio – whose arithmetic value and interpretation had been agreed on after so many 
interactions and iterations internally – was now placed in relation to other 
representations of BigBank: 
First	of	all,	we	reiterate	our	capital	target	of	above	13%.	[…].	
We	have	built	14.4%	capital,	as	you	see,	220	basis	points	in	a	year.	When	we	
then	adjust	this	for	the	[Country	West]	risk-weighted	and	the	CRDIV
18
	effects,	
when	they	come,	then	we	have	a	fully	loaded	Basel	III	today	at	13.4%.	
We	still	have	our	initiatives	on	plan	and	we	are	also	here	delivering	according	
to	our	plan	and	all	the	things	we	are	doing,	our	many	efficiency	initiatives,	our	
very	 standard	 risk	 initiatives,	 and	 so	we	 still	 have	a	pro	 forma	guidance	now	
around	15%	to	16%,	including	these	initiatives,	excluding	profit	and	everything.	
(CEO	at	international	telephone	conference,	authors’	emphasis	added)	
Following the CEO talk, both the Core Tier 1 ratio’s numerical value and its 
implication for dividends and other matters took front stage in the Q&A session of 
the conference call. Giving participants the opportunity to pose questions to 
corporate representatives was routine practice, and the detailed contents of the 
Report and associated documents were often probed by capital market actors 
(Abraham & Bamber, 2017; Matsumoto, Pronk, & Roelofsen, 2011). One example of 
this is the following exchange where the CFO was asked to elaborate on which 
numerical value of the Core Tier 1 ratio that should be used to evaluate whether 
BigBank was on target in its performance (authors’ emphasis added): 
                                                
17 RWA – Risk-Weighted Assets – is used in the denominator of the Core Tier 1 ratio 
calculation, see Footnote 4. 
18 The acronym CRDIV refers to the European Capital Regulation Directive IV (legislative 
package of Directive [2013/36] and Regulation [No 575/2013]). The CRDIV would replace 
the Basel II framework by the then new Basel III framework in European legislation. Basel 
II and Basel III differed slightly in their prescription of how the Core Tier 1 ratio should be 
calculated. 
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Analyst:	Yes,	hi.	Good	afternoon.	Two	questions,	if	I	may.	The	first	one	on	the	
capital.	 You	obviously	 present	 [a]	 number	 of	 Core	 Tier	 1	 Ratios.	What	 is	 the	
actual	figure	that	you	are	looking	at	when	you	[inaudible]	and	what	we	should	
look	 at	 when	 we	 compare	 to	 the	 above	 13%	 target,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 fourth	
quarter?	If	you	could	shed	some	light	on	that,	that	would	be	great.	
The analyst was contesting the Core Tier 1 ratio framing by saying, “What is the 
actual figure?” 
The CFO’s response to this contestation of the Core tier 1 ratio’s framing began by 
invoking the ‘strict volume discipline’ cue, this much-discussed characterization of 
the Core Tier 1 ratio (see Diagrams 4-7, above). He then shifted to anchoring the 
Core Tier 1 ratio – and explaining the inability to produce a clear numerical value – 
in relation to the contents of the regulation and the regulatory environment of 
BigBank’s operations: 
CFO:	 Yes,	 I	 think	we	are	working	hard	on	 the	capital	and	 the	 requirements.	
The	 tying	 point	 is,	 as	 said,	 that	 we	 think	 the	 formal	 capital	 requirement	 for	
[BigBank]	is	around	11.3%.	And	then,	we	have	a	number	of	uncertainties	–	we	
have	uncertainties	[on]	systemic	risk	buffer	calculation,	we	have	on	counter-
cyclical	buffer,	we	have	on	Pillar	2	treatment,	and	then	we	have	some	pending	
approvals,	 which	 is	 quite	 important,	 of	 course,	 for	 our	 capital	 efficiency	
initiatives.	(authors’	emphasis)	
Examples of the phrases and words used in this anchoring include ‘pending 
approvals’ and other concepts which provided a cue structure for framing a particular 
arithmetic value of the Core Tier 1 ratio. These terms were circulating cues which 
could be brought into the specific situation to enact previous framings in interactions 
between regulators, banks and capital market actors regarding the Core Tier 1 ratio 
calculation. The CFO then tried to frame his overall response by linking it to the 
arithmetic target of 13% (in the Financial Plan 2015) to the overall framing of 
BigBank’s ‘delivery on capital’. However, this attempt by the CFO to achieve a 
shared understanding failed, as seen in the analyst response: 
Analyst:	 But	where	 do	 you	 believe	 you	 are,	 and	what's	 the	 real	 Core	 Tier	 1	
Ratio	we	should	look	at	the	kind	(sic)	of	14%	target?	
CFO:	 That	 is	 what	 I	 am	 saying.	 The	 target	we	 are	 operating	with,	 as	we	 are	
waiting	 for	 more	 clarity,	 is	 something	 above	 13%.	 It	 is	 more	 in	 the	 area	 of	
closer	to	14%.	(authors’	emphasis)		
For the analyst to ask about what the ‘real’ Core Tier 1 ratio was arguably constituted 
a test of the framing of this financial number. The short exchange of analyst question 
and CFO response in this last part of the strip could be seen as a mild case of frame-
breaking, since a shared frame of the number was not sustained in the interaction. 
The CFO became less polite and more direct in his communication; his statement 
“That is what I am saying” being an attempt to control the situation. However, in 
terms of the situational roles played by the two parties in typical Q&A sessions 
(Abraham & Bamber, 2017) – that functioned as an important part of the framing 
work of the numbers to reach shared understanding – the exchange was not 
‘breaking the frame’ but rather more of a typical role-play (cf. Goffman, 1974, pp. 
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378-438, on the manufacture of negative experience in framing). Holding to an 
established frame for such interactions, the Q&A session therefore moved on to 
other topics.  
4.6 Epilogue: Picking up on cues in the market response 
We have traced the numerous interactions and iterations to settle financial numbers 
and a story around their interpretation in the silent period, and to enact this framing 
of BigBank’s financial performance when the quarterly report went public. Following 
these two phases of the quarterly reporting cycle, the IR team took part in the 
evaluation of how the capital market had responded to the quarterly report. This 
analysis included both how the BigBank share price had moved, and how analysts 
had written about the quarterly results and made forecasts for the company’s future 
performance. The following compilation of analysts’ final report headings was used 
in a senior management meeting held a few weeks after Q-day (Diagram 10):  
Diagram 10: Compilation of analyst final report headings (Redacted reproduction of senior 
management meeting presentation given by Head of IR, slide 4) 
 
On this slide we can observe how specific – by now perhaps also for the reader quite 
recognizable – cues such as ‘delivery’ (on capital, in particular), were used to 
characterize BigBank’s quarterly performance. In addition to their reiteration of 
specific cues, the IR team’s analysis also indicated that analysts’ forecasts were in line 
with how the specific quarterly financial results had been communicated. Taken 
together, the sentiment expressed by members of the IR team was that they, as well 
as the BigBank senior management, felt that their message had been received. 
Seemingly, there was a shared understanding of the organizational reality represented 
by these financial numbers that had been enacted and maintained across multiple 
sites of interaction. 
BigBank
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5. Concluding discussion 
The BigBank case account provides a rare glimpse into the hitherto unobserved 
backstage work of a listed company’s preparation of an interim report and associated 
public communication. A mix of observations, interviews and detailed working 
document analysis have together provided the contours for how particular numbers 
and narratives iteratively emerge and converge towards a certain capital market 
message. Specific elements of this process are recognizable from previous studies of 
activities in public sites of interaction, and analyses of the contents of published 
financial reports. For example, the studied interactions suggest an attentiveness to 
capital market expectations (Barker et al., 2012; Holland, 1998; Roberts et al., 2006; 
Solomon et al., 2013), for example in the Chief Risk Officer’s agreement to keep a 
previous formulation regarding the ‘stable’ credit quality of the loan portfolio 
underlying the risk-weighted assets in the Core Tier 1 ratio. The account also 
suggests a preference for positive messages (García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011; 
Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Neu et al., 1998), most notably illustrated by the initial 
decision to forego income in the overarching message for the quarter when this 
metric did not show the targeted increase. However, moving beyond these findings, 
the present study’s research design and conceptual framing offers the possibility of 
reconciling competing accounts of what role preparers play in making financial 
numbers take on a certain meaning. Earlier document and interview-based studies 
have inferred either that corporate representatives are disciplined by external 
expectations to give fitting accounts, or that companies manipulate their environment 
by crafting self-serving narratives. Our findings, based on an analysis using concepts 
linked to Goffman’s ideas on the function of framing in achieving situated 
constructions of meaning, nuance these opposing models of corporate agency.  
A first finding centers on the observation of a basic storyline for structuring the 
capital market narrative which was in place before any specific financial numbers 
associated with the period’s performance. This skeleton structure was visible in the 
stripped-down document of the previous quarterly report, where traces of a 
previously articulated frame were combined with abstracted placeholders that stood 
in for the period’s as-yet-unknown financial figures. For example, the first version of 
the section on BigBank’s capital position paired abstracted values such as “2.X%” 
and “EUR X.Xbn” with a narrative about “strong capital generation”, “improved 
core tier 1 ratio” and “reduc[tion of] the risk-weighted assets” (see Diagram 2, 
above). We understand both narrative elements and chosen metrics as cues in the 
process of framing how the new quarter’s performance should be interpreted. 
BigBank’s situated production of meaning was therefore not completely open but 
constrained – although still not completely determined – by traces of previous 
frames. This finding contrasts with how the impression management literature has 
characterized the far-reaching agential capacity of preparers to deploy whatever 
rhetorical tools they see fit in capital market communication (e.g. Aerts, 2005; 
Clatworthy & Jones, 2003; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). Of course, the use of a 
skeleton structure for structuring the new quarter’s communication does not in itself 
contradict that companies can shape what economic reality they convey to external 
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parties. However, our study underscores how the framing of corporate financial 
reporting is a multi-period process. Members of the BigBank organization expressed a 
keen awareness that larger changes to the skeleton structure established by the 
outcome of previous framing processes, notably the text and metrics presented in 
previous quarterly reports as well as the target levels for income, costs and capital 
adequacy in the three-year financial plan, could be problematic for the situated 
construction of meaning around the new quarter’s performance. These observations 
regarding the systematic use of a skeleton structure of cues give some details to the 
process whereby a specific frame, as constructed by certain capital market actors (e.g. 
Beunza & Garud, 2007), can come to circulate and shape preparers’ agency in 
framing new corporate-capital market interactions. 
A second finding of the study further elaborates of how the circulation and (re-
)enactment of frames occurs. The silent period that was the focus of our empirical 
account was characterized by an intensive iteration of narrative and numbers, which 
took place through various interactions between IR team members, senior managers 
and other employees of BigBank. These interactions saw the fleshing out of the 
aforementioned skeleton structure of cues, with revised narratives and specific 
numbers being successively anchored in relation to an evolving framing of BigBank’s 
quarterly performance. Thus, the process of contextualizing various financial 
numbers to make them meaningful (‘framing’) also involved the elaboration of links 
between this context and specific numeric values (‘anchoring’). Anchoring could lead 
to both elaborations and delimitations of the frame, as illustrated by interactions 
concerning the characterization of the Core Tier 1 ratio in relation to dividend pay-
out levels. This aspect of the interpretation of the metric was explicitly consigned to 
the Q&A document, and thereby handled in the conference call and similar 
interactions, rather than incorporated into the written quarterly report. Our empirical 
observations of efforts to successively align the frame, comprising both an 
overarching narrative and chosen metrics, with specific numeric values and detailed 
descriptions underscores the recursive relationship between numbers and narratives, 
where the room for interpretational flexibility was bounded by the anchoring of 
different parts of the frame. In this, the cues operated as a circular referent in the 
framing of BigBank’s quarterly performance: serving both starting point for what to 
make sense of (‘what needs to be made understandable’), and as an outcome (‘what 
must be understandable’).  
Finally, while our study focused on the production of a quarterly report from the 
preparer perspective, we observed various internal interactions where cues from 
capital market actors were brought into the framing process and influenced how 
financial numbers were understood. One example of this was the meeting where 
BigBank’s expected performance in relation to specific metrics were put in relation to 
available consensus estimates (see Diagram 3, above). These metrics – like the 
skeleton structure of the quarterly report – were cues in BigBank’s framing of the 
new quarter’s performance, activating certain frames. This observation resonates with 
previous accounts of how corporate actors are disciplined by capital market 
expectations (e.g. Roberts et al., 2006). However, our study also shows how cues 
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circulated from BigBank to capital market actors. An example of this is how equity 
analysts picked up on, and used, certain concepts that were emphasized in the capital 
market communication. The notion that BigBank was “delivering” on its 
performance targets, notably in relation to Core Tier 1 ratio, emerged in interactions 
within the IR team, and across the BigBank organization. This specific word was 
subsequently used in analyst responses to the quarterly report release (see Diagram 
10). The finding highlights how the on-going framing of financial performance in 
one site of interaction creates traces, in the form of cues, which then circulate across 
other sites of interaction at the corporate-capital market interface. This circulation of 
cues is not unidirectional.  
Our direct observation of the silent period’s process therefore adds to the 
understanding of how the expectations of capital market actors are accommodated in 
company communication. In contrast to previous studies, we could not observe a 
unidirectional and automatic disciplining of BigBank’s representatives (compare 
Kraus & Strömsten, 2012; Roberts et al., 2006; Tengblad, 2004). Rather, our study 
foregrounds the intricate process of producing meaning where neither capital market 
actors nor preparers make sense of financial reporting information in a vacuum. 
There is, in short, interaction in the analytical sense which leads to certain shared 
understandings. The traces of these previously enacted frames, in the form of cues, 
are what we can see travel across spatio-temporal distributed sites of interaction. 
They provide the foundations for re-enactments of certain frames arrived at by 
participants dispersed in time and place, which paired with anchoring enables this 
dispersed framing work to be coordinated into a shared understanding of corporate 
financial performance in a given period across the corporate-capital market 
community. 
This leads us to make an overarching theoretical point vis-à-vis the domain literature 
using Goffman. Cues are a way of conceptually linking structural and procedural 
variants of frame analysis (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014). Cues are traces of enacted 
frames that persist across situations, and thus they provide a vehicle for bridging the 
framing processes that takes place in specific sites. We are not the first to argue for 
the analytical relevance of a procedural view of framing (Czarniawska, 2006) or to 
conceptualize micro-level procedural mechanisms for dynamically aligning frames 
within interactions (see notably Stokes & Hewitt, 1976). However, an important 
difference is that the present study, in part due to its chosen design, is not limited to 
situated framing processes.19 Thus, we extend Lorino et al. (2017) by conceptually 
elaborating on how the dual role of accounting – as generic model and singular event 
– is fulfilled. Not just frame-shifting between and within sites, but frame circulation 
over time between sites and frame activation within sites. We would argue that our 
                                                
19 Compare with the notion of aligning actions (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976), which denote generic 
categories of largely verbal activities (such as for example disclaimers or apologies) that 
people use to deal with problematic occurrences where “[i]nteraction is disrupted, identities 
are threatened, meanings are unclear, situations seem disorderly, people have intentions that 
run counter to others' wishes, seemingly inexplicable events take place, people do not know 
what is happening to them, and the list could be extended almost indefinitely” (ibid., p. 842). 
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analysis begins to articulate a more precise procedural understanding for how people 
become “prepared” (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976, p. 841) through multiple interactions. 
Preparation denotes how “[a] great many of the objects that constitute the human 
world have a ‘pre-existing’ meaning, in the sense that people confront such objects 
with a set of assumptions about them – with a particular preparedness to act” (ibid.). 
Our study also provides an answer to the competing accounts of preparer agency. 
Preparers are constrained in what they say by what they have said and what has been 
picked up by capital market actors but have room to shape interpretation that can 
successively shift what cues are circulated and activated. These conclusions have an 
important scope condition: we have studied a ‘business as usual’ quarterly reporting 
cycle, rather than one under conditions of financial (or other) crisis. This would be 
an interesting topic of investigation, although likely a difficult one to intentionally 
pursue.  
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